Die Deregulierung und Privatisierung des britischen Bussystems außerhalb Londons war der erste 1:1-Versuch der Deregulierung im öffentlichen Verkehr. Wie er gewirkt hat, zeigt diese Arbeit.

This paper aims at characterising the underlying values and assumptions and the actual policy of deregulation and privatisation of the bus market. It will include as well short cross-references in relation to the transport market as a whole. The massive investment in road schemes which is free for everybody to use, distorted the market substantially.

Furthermore, this paper will examine the steps which have been taken and the results, covering a variety of economic and other factors like prices, services, patronage, passenger attitudes, but also external effects like the trends in car ownership. The different effects in the nonderegulated London area and a short outlook into the future will add to the more empiric part. The paper concludes that although reasonable success was achieved in the express coach market and the situation in the rural areas did not deteriorate at least, passengers and employees were the losers in the majority of the market. The policy failed to deliver benefits to them and it failed to increase efficiency as well. Although it decreased public subsidy, the fragmented network resulting from direct "on the road"-competition made the situation worse.

Many aims set out prior to the relevant steps were not achieved. It can be shown that some expectations were not consistent with economic theory and disregarded important side effects. Furthermore, the laissez-faire approach contains no prospect of agreed values and targets for the development of the transport market as a whole. A long term policy to adjust to transport on a ecologically sustainable basis is urgently needed.